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In this article, we combine advances in both survey research and scaling techniques to estimate a common
dimension for political parties across the member states of the European Union. Most previous scholarship has
either ignored or assumed cross-national comparability of party placements across a variety of dimensions. The
2010 wave of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey includes anchoring vignettes which we use as ‘‘bridge votes’’ to place
parties from different countries on a common space. We estimate our dimensions using the ‘‘blackbox’’ technique.
Our results demonstrate both the usefulness of anchoring vignettes and the broad applicability of the blackbox
scaling routine. Further, the resulting scale offers a cross-nationally comparable interval-level measure of a party’s
left/right ideological position with a high degree of face validity. In short, we argue that the left/right economic
dimension travels well across European countries.
F
rom the right-wing Danish Liberal Alliance
(LA) to the leftist German Die Linke (LINKE),
European political parties span the economic
left/right ideological space.1 Since the economic
left/right dimension is ‘‘the one dimension that argu-
ably allows for meaningful cross-national comparisons’’
(Adams 2012, 402), much of the research that incor-
porates placements of political parties on the left/right
dimension assumes, at least implicitly, comparability of
the measures across national contexts (cf. Adams et al.
2006; Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011;
Aspinwall 2007; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002;
Marks et al. 2006; Tavits 2007; Tavits and Letki 2009).
While proponents of expert surveys find that they
provide cross-nationally valid and reliable measures
of party positioning for scholars of European political
parties (Bakker et al. 2012; Benoit and Laver 2006;
Hooghe et al. 2010; Ray 1999; Steenbergen and Marks
2007), critics point out that central concepts, such
as economic left/right, lack a secure anchor in the
surveys, leaving the expert to determine their own
frame of reference (Budge 2000; McDonald, Mendes,
and Kim 2007). Without a shared anchor, scholars
are less certain whether a centrist party in Sweden
would be considered a centrist or a left-wing party in
the United Kingdom. Taken to its logical extreme,
this problem could confound cross-country compar-
ison, implying that researchers using expert surveys
risk missing potential differences between countries.
In other words, we do not have a common ideological
space for European political parties to use for cross-
national comparisons.
McDonald, Mendes, and Kim recommend that
future ‘‘expert surveys might be able to create anchors
by identifying for respondents a common reference’’
(2007, 74). In this article, we address this criticism by
combining recent methodological advances in survey
research with well-known scaling techniques to estimate
cross-nationally comparable ideological positions of
political parties across a range of countries. We use
anchoring vignettes embedded in cross-national
surveys to estimate a common scale for economic
left/right ideological positions of political parties.
The technique we employ is generalizable to nearly
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any survey-based perception data that include some
sort of bridging information (i.e., some question(s)
in the survey that bridge across different national or
institutional contexts). In our application, we use
the anchoring vignettes included in the 2010 wave of
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2012) as
bridges to place political parties in the European
Union on a common ideological space. We estimate
the positions using blackbox scaling, which was
developed by Poole (1998). The scaling routine fits
the data well and returns estimates that have strong
face validity.
The issue of cross-context comparability is rele-
vant to a wide variety of substantive areas. One of the
first, and most prominent, attempts to overcome this
problem was the work of Aldrich and McKelvey
(1977), who developed a scaling routine to address
the fact that survey respondents’ perceptions of the
ideological positions of presidential candidates
were often substantially different from one another.
If such differences were real, then placing candidates
and respondents on a common scale would be highly
problematic. Their technique assumes the candidate
positions are fixed and treats differences in respond-
ents’ placements of candidates as different interpre-
tations of the underlying scale and then corrects for
these differences. Poole (1998) generalized their solu-
tion to allow for missing data and multiple dimensions
with his blackbox technique applied to a transposed
matrix of perception data.
Applying scaling techniques such as Aldrich-
McKelvey or Blackbox requires some sort of bridging
information. Bridging information can come in many
forms (e.g., votes or actors) and allows placements of
different stimuli (e.g., parties or legislators) to be located
on the same latent scale, thus facilitating cross-context
comparisons. Bridge votes are commonly employed in
American politics literature to place Senators and House
members (Clinton and Meirowitz 2003; Poole 1998),
actors from different institutions (Bailey 2007; Epstein
et al. 2007), or legislators from different states on a
common scale (Shor, Berry, and McCarty 2010).
More recently, King et al. (2004) introduced the
idea of anchoring vignettes to survey research in
political science. These authors demonstrate how to
correct for cross-cultural differences in the respondents’
perceptions of difficult to measure concepts. Providing
concrete examples of these concepts in the survey
helps to overcome the biases in self-placement that
individuals in varying cultural contexts often display.
King and Wand (2007) develop software that helps
diagnose, explain, and correct for this differential item
functioning (DIF) in perception.
We combine these two ideas, drawing from the
strengths of both techniques. Including anchoring
vignettes in the survey allows us to measure the
degree to which the experts perceive the left/right
economic scale of political competition in the same
way. By applying blackbox scaling, using the anchoring
vignettes as bridges, we generate a new variable that
has highly desirable properties. Namely, the resulting
measure is interval-level, cross-nationally comparable,
and exportable for use in subsequent analyses. Finally,
we estimate bootstrapped standard errors for the
placements in order to summarize the uncertainty
in the results.
The article proceeds as follows. The second section
introduces the problem of cross-national comparability
as it pertains to the study of ideological positioning
on the left/right economic scale. We then provide an
overview of the use of anchoring vignettes to address
DIF in survey-based measures. The next section con-
siders the use of blackbox scaling applied to percep-
tion data using anchoring vignettes as bridges. The
following section describes the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (CHES) and provides descriptive information
regarding the anchoring vignettes. We then provide
the results of our estimation. To preview the conclu-
sions, we present a common scale of European parties
on the economic left/right dimension. Further, we find
that experts conceive of the left/right economic dimen-
sion in similar ways across Europe, lending confidence
to scholars interested in cross-national comparisons of
party positions.
Comparable Cross-National Party
Position Measures
Aldrich and McKelvey sought to resolve ‘‘the inability
to obtain good empirically based measurements of
the positions of the candidates and citizens in a
common issue space.’’ (1977, 111): Our article draws
on the insights of those authors as well as innovations
in scaling and survey methods (King et al. 2004; King
and Wand 2007; Poole 1998; Wand 2013) to address
a comparable problem in the measurement of polit-
ical party positioning. Scholars of European political
parties often require cross-nationally valid and equiv-
alent measures of party positioning.
European Parliament (EP) research provides a
specific example. Marsh and Mikhaylov argue that
voter policy considerations and political party compe-
tition must be structured by one overarching dimension
for the development of a European representation
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system, and that ‘‘[t]he left/right dimension has
been most often identified as the dominant dimension
of political competition both on the national and
European levels, thus serving as a necessary link
between these two levels’’ (2010, 7) They go on to
point out that this dimension has been found to
structure the behavior of parties and voters in EP
elections (Van Der Brug et al. 2009), as well as
party group organization and competition within the
European Parliament (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006),
which demonstrates that comparable measurements of
left/right positions are important to our understanding
of European multilevel governance.
Whether drawn from the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP) data (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann
et al. 2006), expert surveys (Benoit and Laver 2006;
Hooghe et al. 2010; Ray 1999; Steenbergen and Marks
2007), or public opinion surveys such as the European
Election Studies, research that incorporates information
on the positioning of political parties on economic
left/right policies assumes, at least implicitly, com-
parability of the measures of positioning across a
variety of national and cultural contexts (Adams et al.
2006; Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011; Aspinwall
2007; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks et al.
2006; Tavits 2007; Tavits and Letki 2009). With few
exceptions, such as Gschwend, Lo, and Proksch (2014)
and König, Marbach, and Osnabrügge (2013), the
majority of this research does not test the comparability
of these data across countries nor attempt to
correct for systematic biases that may be present.2
When relying on expert surveys or public opinion
measures of party positioning, it becomes important to
consider the potential obstacle that different groups of
survey respondents may answer questions with ordinal
response categories in systematically different ways
because ‘‘some people obviously differ in optimism,
agreeability, mood, propensity to use extreme
categories, and other characteristics’’ (King and
Wand 2007, 46–47). ‘‘Response-category differential
item functioning,’’ or DIF, seems especially likely in
cross-national surveys. The presence of DIF, whether
because of individual or broader cultural context, in
expert or mass survey respondents potentially com-
promises the comparability of the measurements
produced by these instruments. In other words, it
may complicate our ability to assert that an expert
on the Swedish party system thinks of and applies
concepts such as ‘‘left’’ and ‘‘right’’ the same way as
an expert on British parties when they are asked to
place the parties of their respective countries on an
economic left/right scale.
The Comparative Manifesto Project’s (CMP)
data are also not exempt from these concerns. CMP
researchers have analyzed and coded postwar election
manifestos for a large number of parties in many
industrialized democracies, providing information on
various parties’ support for several political issues.
Although CMP coders are provided with identical
coding specifications, the coders are still country-
specific individuals subject to the same possible
differences in optimism, mood, or likelihood to
use extreme categories as the individuals that compose
expert or public opinion surveys. It is difficult to know
whether or not the country-specific coders are prone
to DIF, but it is plausible to assume that some degree
of subjectivity is present in the scoring of party
manifestos and that these perceptions would differ
from country to country (Bakker et al. 2011;
Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit 2012).
Recent research by König, Marbach, and Osnab-
rügge (2013) attempts to directly address the question
of cross-national and temporal comparability with the
comparative manifesto data. The authors use Bayesian
dynamic latent variable models to evaluate the com-
parability of the left/right positions of political parties
as derived from their manifestos. In order to test for
such differences, the authors employ an innovative
strategy to create bridge observations with which to
construct a common scale across years and countries.
Much like Gschwend, Lo, and Proksch (2014), though,
the validity of the bridging observations is based upon
some strong assumptions, namely that left/right scores
based on the European Party Manifesto (EMP) data
are necessarily cross-nationally comparable and that
a party’s left/right score at its first European election is
the same as its left/right score at the preceding national
election. As the authors acknowledge (König, Mar-
bach, and Osnabrügge 2013, 21), these strong assump-
tions are not directly tested.
2Gschwend, Lo, and Proksch (2014) use 2009 European Election
Study surveys to place parties and the public on a common scale
within country. They then cleverly use a party’s European
Parliament party affiliation to bridge across countries. This
technique has the advantage of being able to be applied
retroactively. In contrast, our technique is only applicable when
anchoring vignettes have been included on a survey, thus it
cannot be applied retroactively. However, their technique has the
disadvantage of relying on EP party groups to act as reliable
bridges, but research suggests that European party groups can
include parties that are quite ideologically different. As McElroy
and Benoit (2010, 20) argue, a national party and a European
party group can diverge in policy to some extent before that
policy incongruence prompts the national party to switch to
another group. Crucially, some parties’ EP group membership
may seem inappropriate from the perspective of policy alone.
Given that we control the design of the anchoring vignettes,
however, our bridges should be reliable.
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Even so, the König, Marbach, and Osnabrügge
(2013) corrected scale correlates highly with the un-
adjusted CHES left/right scores, suggesting that their
measure has a high degree of face validity. At the same
time, they highlight some bias issues with the manifesto
data that could affect scholars conducting cross-na-
tional or time-series analysis with certain groups of
countries. This fact further highlights the importance of
applying similar tests to the expert survey data. Al-
though limited by time coverage, our technique using
anchoring vignettes has the advantage of being pre-
mised on a single assumption, vignette equivalence,
which we are able to directly test in our analysis.
In order to account for potential differences in
perception of the left/right economic dimension
across countries, it is necessary to have experts, voters,
or text coders each ‘‘place’’ a common party on the
scale. Given that experts and voters are only asked to
place parties in their own countries and that CMP
coders only code party manifestos from one country,
this has been a seemingly insurmountable task. If,
instead, there were a common party placed by all
experts, then this problem would be tractable.
Anchoring Vignettes
In a recent series of articles, King, Wand, and
co-authors (King et al. 2004; King and Wand 2007;
Wand 2013) introduced anchoring vignettes to
political science as a way to identify whether survey
respondents use ordinal response categories differently.
Some respondents, for example, may have higher stan-
dards for what ‘‘strongly agree’’ means, thereby com-
plicating comparisons with other respondents. In their
articles, King and his colleagues used a cross-national
survey item focusing on political efficacy to illustrate
the problem. In this survey, respondents in Mexico and
China answered the following question, ‘‘How much
say do you have in getting the government to address
issues that interest you?’’ Respondents use the following
scale (1) ‘‘No say,’’ (2) ‘‘Little say,’’ (3) ‘‘Some say,’’ (4)
‘‘A lot of say,’’ (5) ‘‘Unlimited say.’’ Contrary to
expectations, Chinese respondents had much higher
levels of political efficacy than their Mexican counter-
parts (King et al. 2004). Given that Freedom House
rates China as not free (6.5/7, where 7 is least free) while
Mexico is rated as partly free (3/7),3 most observers
would expect that Mexicans would have higher levels of
efficacy.
While this surprising finding may be a result of
actual differences in perceived efficacy, King et al.
(2004) expect that the result simply reflects differing
standards for efficacy between Mexico and China. To
ascertain whether respondents perceived the efficacy
question scale the same way, King et al. (2004, 193)
included several vignettes describing the sense of
efficacy of several hypothetical people alongside the
self-placement to anchor a shared reference point.
Using these vignettes as anchors across individuals
and contexts, the researchers can correct the raw
responses, thereby obtaining a comparable DIF-free
measure of political efficacy. After correcting for DIF,
the survey showed that Mexicans have much higher
levels of efficacy than Chinese respondents. As King
and Wand report, ‘‘In fact, although the raw responses
had the Chinese judging themselves to have consider-
ably more efficacy than the Mexicans judged themselves
to have, the DIF-corrected responses indicate the
reverse . . . ’’(2007, 3). This result clearly demonstrates
that ignoring DIF in cross-national survey research
could be seriously misleading to researchers and policy
makers.
Turning to the use of expert surveys to identify
ideological placements of political parties, we are
interested in whether the ideological placements of
parties on a left/right scale are cross-nationally com-
parable. In short, do we know whether a ‘‘4’’ in Sweden
on an 11-point ideological scale is the same as a ‘‘4’’ in
the United Kingdom? For example, would the British
Labour Party, a center-left party in the United Kingdom
in 2010 (4 on an 11-point scale), be perceived as center-
right by Swedish experts? As with the efficacy example,
we need to evaluate whether the raw responses are
cross-nationally comparable. To do so, we first need to
consider alternative scaling techniques.
Aldrich-McKelvey and The Blackbox
The Aldrich-McKelvey scaling procedure is widely
viewed as one of the best solutions for correcting
DIF in perceptual data (King et al. 2004; Saiegh
2009). Palfrey and Poole (1987) show that the
Aldrich-McKelvey (A-M) solution does an excep-
tional job of recovering the positions of the stimuli
(e.g., presidential candidates) even in the presence
of heteroskedastic errors over the stimuli.
The A-M solution was developed for scaling
individuals’ reported perceptions of the locations of
stimuli (e.g., political candidates) along a scale with
labeled end points. A-M assume that the individual3Freedom House scores can be found at www.freedomhouse.org.
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reports a noisy linear transformation of the true
location of the stimulus. The A-M solution, then,
recovers both the ‘‘true’’ underlying configuration of
the stimuli as well as a set of parameters that map the
noisy perceptions onto the ‘‘true’’ scale. This map-
ping corrects for differences in location as well as
differences in relative distances between points. That
is, the A-M solution produces a scale where a ‘‘4’’ in
Sweden is the same as a ‘‘4’’ in the United Kingdom
and where a one-unit change in the scale means the
same thing across different contexts. It is these
individual linear maps that allow both respondents
and stimuli to be placed on a common scale.
Formally,
ai þ bizij ¼ zj þ uij; ð1Þ
Where a and b are the linear maps, zij is the perceived
location of stimulus j by individual i, zj is the ‘‘true’’
location of stimulus j, and uij meets Gauss-Markov
assumptions.4
Thus, the solution for the individual transforma-
tion parameters is simply the ‘‘least-squares regression
of the reported on the actual (unknown) positions of
the candidates’’ (Aldrich and McKelvey 1977, 115).
For our purposes, though, the major limitations to the
A-M solution are that it only works for unidimen-
sional solutions, and it cannot handle missing data.
Poole (1998) generalizes A-M to allow for miss-
ing data and the estimation of higher-dimensional
solutions. Poole’s blackbox scaling procedure can
handle both perception and preference data and has
been shown to recover valid and precise estimates of
both stimuli and respondents. In order to estimate
positions of the stimuli, political parties in our appli-
cation, in a common space, it is required that the
respondents answer some of the same questions. In
many applications, this has been a self-placement
question combined with placements of the stimuli.
Like A-M, the model assumes the stimuli have true
positions, but the respondent perceptions of these posi-
tions are linear transformations of these true positions.
The model then estimates the parameters of these
linear transformations (constants and weights) for
each respondent and corrects the placements of the
stimuli and respondents appropriately.5
In our application, the stimuli are the parties and
the respondents are the experts. Party experts in any
given country, however, only place parties from their
country. When compiled together, the matrix of all
experts by all parties is a block diagonal matrix with
missing values on the off diagonals. For example,
British experts do not place Belgian parties, so there is
an abundance of missingness. This is not true,
however, for the vignette parties on the survey. Every
expert, regardless of country of expertise, was asked
to place the three vignette parties and, as will be
described in more detail below, were largely in
agreement as to the ordering of the vignette positions.
We use this information to correct for any potential
DIF in the perception of the left/right economic scales
and correct the perceived positions of the stimuli in
exactly the same way as A-M.6
Our resulting data matrix has parties down
the rows and experts across the columns—which is
the key to allowing common-space scaling. Given the
demands on the data, four times as many placements
of each stimuli as there are dimensions is appropriate
(i.e., we need a minimum of eight experts per party to
conduct the scaling). This results in the loss of several
parties from our sample because we have fewer than
eight experts in some of the countries in the survey.
With these limitations, the resulting data matrix has
118 parties (rows) and 224 experts (columns) across
14 countries. Given that a vast majority of the experts
places each of the three vignette parties, there are over
160 ‘‘bridging’’ observations (experts) in the data
which can be used to place all stimuli (parties) on
a common scale. In the following section, we describe
the anchoring vignettes in the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert
Survey data.
Vignettes in the 2010 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey
The 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) measures
party positioning on European integration, ideology,
and policy issues for 227 national parties in a
variety of European countries, extending a time
series dating back to 1996 (Hooghe et al. 2010; Ray
1999; Steenbergen and Marks 2007). In addition to
the general left/right, economic left/right, european
integration, and social left/right scales, the survey
includes a battery of 18 issue-specific questions that
are designed to capture a number of potentially
4For more technical information about our use of the Aldrich
and McKelvey (1977) and (Poole 1998) procedures, see the
online appendix.
5For additional details on estimation, see Poole (1998) and the
online appendix.
6This technique provides better estimates of the stimuli (parties)
than the respondents (experts), but given our interest in the
stimuli only, this poses no problem.
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salient dimensions and are informed by prior
scholarship on party competition in Europe
(Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe, Marks, and
Wilson 2002; Inglehart 1977, 1990; Kitschelt 1994;
Lijphart 1999; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).7
Researchers have cross-validated the 2010 CHES
data with both party manifesto data and public
opinion data (Bakker et al. 2013). Other research
finds that Chapel Hill expert judgments correlate
highly with measures drawn from different datasets
(Netjes and Binnema 2007; Steenbergen and Marks
2007). Furthermore, expert survey-based party posi-
tions are more consistent with the evaluations of
voters and parliamentarians than data currently
available from party manifestos (Marks et al. 2007).
However, previous reliability tests of expert survey
data (CHES or Benoit and Laver) have not tested for
DIF bias, so the question of cross-national compara-
bility remains.
In the survey, experts place political parties on
a basic economic left/right dimension focusing on
the government’s role in the economy, taxes, and
redistribution. After the experts answer all the sub-
stantive questions about the parties, the survey presents
a series of vignettes and asks experts to place these
hypothetical parties on the same 0–10 scale. Below, we
present the vignettes from the survey.
Party A views the provision of a social safety net
as important, but believes there is a sharp trade-off
between welfare spending and economic competitiveness.
It favors limiting government regulation to instances of
market failure and prefers cuts in social spending over new
taxes to meet rising social needs.
Party B views the equalization of life chances for all
citizens as an important goal of government. It favors
active government in regulating domestic and interna-
tional markets and supports steeply progressive taxes to
fund redistributive social programs.
Party C believes in small government. It favors minimal
regulation of domestic and international markets, sup-
ports the privatization of many government operations,
and opposes high taxes to fund redistributive social
programs.
In order to achieve vignette equivalence, the experts
need to order the parties in a consistent way across
countries. According to King et al., vignette equiva-
lence is the ‘‘assumption that the level of the variable
represented in any one vignette is perceived by all
respondents in the same way and on the same
unidimensional scale, apart from random measure-
ment error’’ (2004, 194). We expected these vignette
parties to follow a consistent pattern along the
economic left/right scale, ranging from left-wing
(Party B) to right-wing (Party A) and further right-
wing (Party C). Empirical analysis confirmed that
most experts perceived the vignettes in the intended
order (Bakker et al. 2011).8 These findings demonstrate
that the vignette equivalence assumption has been
met, suggesting that we can assert that the economic
left/right dimension as described by the vignettes
has a ‘‘logically coherent and consistent meaning in
different cultures’’ (King et al. 2004, 194).
Given the large degree of agreement on the part
of the experts regarding the placements of the vignette
parties, these placements can be used to correct for any
potential DIF in the expert perceptions of the left/right
economic scale. Although the anchoring vignette
software developed by King and Wand (2007) makes
it simple to diagnose and correct for DIF using
either a parametric or nonparametric solution, their
technique does not yield an exportable, continuous,
DIF-corrected variable nor does it yield estimates of
uncertainty for the DIF-corrected placements.
Their nonparametric method can create a
DIF-corrected variable, which could then be exported
and used in subsequent models, but it is rather
coarsely measured and is highly influenced by the
distances between vignette parties. If two vignette
parties are relatively far apart from one another, then
the distribution of parties across the categories of the
DIF-corrected variable will be highly skewed, with
one category dominating the others. The researcher
can attenuate this problem by including more vignettes
in the survey and designing them to be as evenly
spaced from one another as possible. Conditional on
the length of the survey and the number of ordered
categories in the variable(s) of interest, this can add a
nontrivial number of items to the survey, thus increas-
ing its expense. Regardless of the number of vignettes
included on the survey, the DIF-corrected variable will
7The Chapel Hill expert survey incorporates most of the ques-
tions that were used for European countries in Benoit and Laver’s
(2006, 2007) 47 country expert survey from 2002 to 2003. The
survey questions and data can be found at chesdata.eu.
8Nearly 89% of the experts did not violate the expected order,
while another 10% had only one violation. The frequency table
showing all expert orderings of the experts is available in the
online appendix. Bakker et al. (2011) also used the rank-order
correlations of the vignette parties across all countries to ascertain
whether the vignettes fall on a cross-nationally comparable-
ordered scale. With the exception of Greece, the mean place-
ments of the vignette parties on the left/right scale are perceived
in the same order across all countries. The Greece experts
perceived the vignette parties A and C as equals (B , A 5 C).
Given the lack of vignette equivalence in Greece, we had to
remove Greece from the data.
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have a set number of categories (2J 1 1 where J is the
number of vignettes).
The parametric model treats the placement as the
response variable and corrects for DIF in the estima-
tion of the placement variable. Compared to the
nonparametric method, this approach has the advan-
tage of needing only a few vignettes (technically only
one) to complete the estimation (King et al. 2004;
King and Wand 2007). This approach estimates a
censored ordered-probit model with random cut points
that can vary as a function of respondent-specific
covariates. The estimates of the cut points for the
ordered categories may often be of interest. This
approach is ideal if the researcher is interested in
diagnosing and explaining the causes of DIF as the
estimated effects for the covariates on the random
cut points provide this information. Although the
results from this routine can be highly informative,
it does restrict the variable of interest to the left-
hand side of the regression and does not yield a new,
exportable, DIF-corrected variable. If a researcher
wants to use a DIF-corrected measure of ideological
placements as an explanatory variable and/or desires
an interval-level measure of the concept, other
scaling techniques are necessary.
The European Common Space
Using anchoring vignettes to help bridge across
countries, we apply the blackbox method described
above to the 2010 round of the Chapel Hill expert
survey. We estimate a two-dimensional solution for the
economic left/right position of the parties in our sample.
The decomposition of the data provides a diagnostic for
the dimensionality of the underlying scale.
The data consist of 118 parties (rows) and 224
experts (columns) in 14 countries. We have responses
from over 160 experts per vignette party and a range
of 8 to 17 expert placements for each actual political
party in the data. Given the structure of the data
(experts on the columns), this gives us ample in-
formation with which to bridge across countries.
That is, Equation (1) is identified, and the individual
transformation parameters are estimable. These
parameters are the ‘‘linear maps’’ that allow the
stimuli to be placed in a common space.
The first dimension explains approximately 87%
of the variance in the party placements, with the
second dimension adding an additional 6%. Figure 1
displays the plot of the first common-space dimension
versus the second common-space dimension, with the
raw, unscaled CHES data represented with shapes.
Parties with a mean expert placement on the left-end of
the scale (, 3) are circles, those with mean expert
placements between 3 and 7 are squares, and those
greater than 7 are triangles.
To further assess the face validity of the results, we
include party labels for the markers. In Figure 1, the
parties to the furthest left and right are the Worker’s
Party of Belgium (PVDA/PTB) and the Danish Liberal
Alliance, respectively. These are also the two most
extreme parties according to the unadjusted mean
placements by the experts. The ordering of the other
parties along the X-axis strongly suggests that the
first common-space dimension is the classic economic
left/right dimension.
The meaning of the second dimension is less
obviously clear from this plot. The British National
Party and the Austrian FPÖ both appear as extreme
outliers on this dimension in Figure 1. In contrast,
the mean expert left/right placement of these
parties is approximately in the middle of the scale,
which is where the common-space solution placed
them as well.
Upon further inspection, however, a commonality
between the two parties is the extreme disagreement
among the experts in their placements. In fact,
experts in the United Kingdom and in Austria place
these parties from 0 to 10 along the economic left/right
scale, spanning the entire range of the scale. This
indicates that expert uncertainty in the placement of
parties on the economic left/right scale could explain
the parties’ positions on the second dimension.
FIGURE 1 Two-Dimensional Left/Right
Economic Solution, with Party Labels
(Left 5 Circles, Moderate 5 Squares,
Right 5 Triangles)
Source: http://chesdata.eu/replication.html.
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In order to better characterize the uncertainty in the
party placements, we estimated bootstrap standard
errors for the parties on both dimensions. We sampled
1,000 replicate data sets by sampling from the experts
with replacement. This required a bit of additional
‘‘record keeping’’ given the missingness discussed above.
That is, in order to maintain the common-space scores,
we had to sample the appropriate experts with replace-
ment from the appropriate countries. We then compute
standard errors by summarizing the results of the 1,000
blackbox estimations. Figure 2 displays the standard
errors for each party in the data for each country
individually. It is immediately apparent that the parties
with more extreme values on the second common-space
dimension also have considerably larger standard errors
in terms of their placements on the first dimension.
Given this result, it appears that the second dimension
captures a degree of uncertainty around the party
placements. Since the second dimension only explains
6% of the variance in party placements, we concentrate
attention on the first dimension.
Using the first-dimension scores, Figure 3 presents
party ideological positions and their associated 95%
confidence intervals. Here again, we see the large con-
fidence bounds for parties such as the British BNP and
the Austrian FPÖ.9
Notice that Figure 3 places all European parties
in a single common space, so we can compare the
left/right positions (and rank order) of parties from
different countries with far more confidence than
previous estimates of party ideological positions.
By simply looking at the placements and confidence
intervals, readers can quickly evaluate whether a
French left-wing party is further right-wing than a
Swedish or Hungarian left-wing party.
This comparability has practical value for
European party scholars. Whitaker and Lynch
(2013), for example, use the weighted positions
of national parties as measured in the 2010 CHES
data to calculate the ideological diversity of party
groups in the European Parliament. Their analysis
assumes cross-national comparability in the left/right
positioning of political parties across the European
Union; our results lend credibility to this important, as
yet untested, assumption.
Finally, we conduct analyses to assess the face
validity of the common-space scores. In Figure 4,
we present country-specific graphs of the common-
space first dimension against the mean economic
left/right placements from the experts.
Figure 4 shows that in most countries, the ordering
from left to right does not change in interesting ways.
In fact, in very few countries is the rank-order corre-
lation between the two scales less than 0.90, indicating
that the rank ordering is extremely similar across the
two measures. There are some differences in rank
orders in the newer member states of the EU, but the
smallest correlation is still 0.81, indicating a large
amount of agreement.10
In addition to comparing with the raw expert
scores, we also compared the common-space scores
with two other commonly used measures of party
placements, drawing on the European Election Survey
and the Comparative Manifesto Project database.11
FIGURE 2 Bootstrapped Standard Errors for
First and Second Common-Space
Dimension
9The blackbox scaling routine provides additional information in
terms of the fit of the model for specific parties. In the online
appendix, we present the number of expert placements and the
R2 for each party in the data. In the analysis, the R2 is a measure
of how much of the variance in a given party’s placement scores
is explained by the latent dimensions.
10We present the rank-order correlations along with the number
of parties in each country in the online appendix.
11For the EES and manifesto data, see http://eeshomepage.net
and https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu. The EES placements are
the public’s average left/right placement of the parties while the
CMP measure is the left/right summary placement (‘‘rile’’).
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The common-space correlations for EES and CMP are
0.85 and 0.51, respectively. Figure 5 presents the
relationships between the common-space scores and
the other two measures, with CMP on the left-hand
axis and EES on the right-hand side. Despite a few
cases off the diagonal, especially in the CMP compar-
ison, Figure 5 shows a strong relationship between the
indicators.
Figures 4 and 5 offer evidence that the estimates
from the blackbox technique produce valid,
FIGURE 3 European Parties in a Common Ideological Space
Note: In this plot, the dots represent the placement of each party along the first common-
space dimension, and the bars are 95% confidence intervals built using bootstrapped 
standard errors.
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cross-nationally comparable placement of parties
on the economic left/right dimension. In addition,
this consistency between the common-space scale
and the unadjusted expert mean placements
should be seen as providing confidence to researchers
interested in previous waves of the CHES surveys.12
Based on these analyses, we assert that previous waves
of the survey can be treated as providing valid, cross-
nationally comparable measures of party positions.
Furthermore, these analyses offer an internal
validity check of the common-space scale. Intracountry
party-position rank orderings are not as susceptible
to DIF as cross-country comparisons; because the
common-space scale matches the intracountry expert
rankings, we have more confidence in the validity of
our measure. Returning to Figure 3, then, we offer for
the first time a reliable ideological rank ordering
of all European parties—within the 14 countries
analyzed—on a common ideological space.
Discussion
To study political parties cross-nationally, researchers
need reliable estimates of party positions. While
manifestos offer a potential solution with obvious
advantages in data availability across time and space,
this approach is not without limitations. Scholars
cannot ignore the fact that manifestos are strategic
documents written by the parties themselves. Due to
campaign priorities or intraparty dissent, manifestos
do not always discuss all policy areas, which limits
analysis of any extant but unmentioned positions.
Quite simply, what parties say in manifestos does not
necessarily equate to objective policy positions.
In the last few decades, expert surveys have
emerged as a viable alternative to the manifestos
(Bakker et al. 2012; Benoit and Laver 2006, 2007;
Hooghe et al. 2010; Ray 1999; Steenbergen and Marks
2007), a complementary data source that meets
requests for an emphasis on observable party behav-
ior rather than party promises as measures of party
positions (Adams, Ezrow, and Leiter 2012; Adams,
Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011; Fortunato and
FIGURE 4 First Common-Space Dimension and Mean-Expert Placements, by Country
Note: This figure displays the relationship between the first common-space dimension and the unadjusted mean-expert 
placements from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, by country.
12Similarly, the fact that König, Marbach, and Osnabrügge’o
(2013) bias-corrected manifesto data correlates highly with the
unadjusted CHES positions is encouraging.
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Stevenson 2013). Prior to this article, however,
researchers could not know with certainty whether
experts in different countries perceived the ideological
questions in the same way. In short, as McDonald,
Mendes, and Kim (2007) have argued, expert survey
proponents could not confidently assert that a ‘‘2’’ in
Sweden would be a ‘‘2’’ in the United Kingdom or
Estonia without using anchors. With the anchoring
vignettes embedded in the 2010 CHES survey and the
innovative use of existing scaling techniques in this
article, we have addressed this concern. As expert
surveys become more widely used in other subfields of
political science (Adams et al. 2011; cf. Stone and
Simas 2010), establishing the extent of comparability
in expert evaluations takes on additional importance
for the broader discipline.
A conventional application of the anchoring
vignettes technique is appropriate and necessary for
detecting and/or diagnosing the causes of DIF. If,
however, a researcher’s interest lies in estimating
a latent position and then using this scale as either
a right- or left-hand side variable in subsequent work,
the anchoring vignette technology must be combined
with other methods. We have shown that anchoring
vignettes can be used as bridge votes in a set of scaling
algorithms designed to place respondents and stimuli
on common scales. A-M scaling yields such a result as
long as some sort of self-placement score is available.
If, however, there is interest in comparing the
placements of stimuli and/or respondents across
contexts, or if the scaling solution is multidimensional,
then blackbox scaling is required as there will be miss-
ing data, i.e., respondents in one context that do not
place stimuli in a different context.
In such settings, anchoring vignettes provide the
bridges that allow the estimation of a common-space
solution. Our technique does not diagnose the causes
of DIF, as does the anchoring vignette software, but it
does create an exportable variable that is free of DIF.
Our proposed strategy easily applies to any survey-based
perception data that includes anchoring vignettes or
some other bridging information. The combination of
anchoring vignettes and blackbox scaling creates a pow-
erful tool to test for and overcome issues of cross-
contextual comparisons with broad applicability to
a variety of research agendas. While the application in
this article focuses on the cross-national comparability
of expert survey data, the methodological contributions
of this article are useful to most research involving
survey-based placements of positions of people, parties,
and institutions across different contexts. For instance,
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) argue for the need for
cross-nationally comparable measures of clientelism
using expert surveys; the techniques developed here
would work well to advance that agenda.
In using the three hypothetical parties included
in the CHES as the bridge items to jointly scale the
expert perceptions data for the country-specific
parties, this article presents an innovative application
of anchoring vignettes. Including the anchoring
vignettes on expert surveys of party ideological
positions facilitates the estimation of an interval-
level, two-dimensional scale. The resulting estimates
fit the data well and have strong face validity, given
the high correlation between the first dimension of
the common-space solution and other common
measures of ideological positions of the parties in
our sample.
It is true that the present technique cannot be
applied to previous waves of the survey that lacked
anchoring vignettes, but the relatively consistent
group of countries, stable pool of experts surveyed,
and centrality of the economic left/right dimension to
European political competition support the cross-
national validity of expert placements in previous
rounds of the survey. The increased confidence we
have in asserting the comparability of expert place-
ments of parties on the economic left/right scale
across the wide range of countries included in the
CHES data is relevant for scholars interested in party
politics (Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis 2013), the
causes and electoral consequences of party policy
FIGURE 5 First Common-Space Dimension, EES,
and CMP Party Placements
Note: This figure displays the relationship between the first 
common-space dimension and the left/right party placements 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (circles) and the first 
common-space dimension and left/right placements based on 
the European Election Study (diamonds).
Source: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/publications/marpor 
and http://eeshomepage.net/ees-2009-study/
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shifts in multiparty democracies (Adams, Ezrow, and
Somer-Topcu 2011), and coalition behavior (Fortu-
nato and Stevenson 2013), along with scholars in-
terested in adopting best practices for survey-based
research.
Significantly for expert survey data users, our
results suggest that party experts in Europe view the
left/right economic dimension of party competition
in largely the same way across countries. The left/
right economic dimension travels well throughout
Europe.
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